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ASSIMILATING ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION INTO LEGAL RULES AND
THE PROBLEM WITH
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME
Richard J. Lazarus*
Others in this Symposium are, quite rightly, celebrating the accom-
plishments of environmental law during the past twenty-five years:
There is certainly much to applaud. In relatively few years this country
has adopted a vast array of environmental protection programs set forth
in hundreds of pages of statutes and thousands of pages of regulations.
These ambitious programs have left few areas of the law untouched in
their persistent effort to limit activities that damage the natural environ-
ment. Environmental lawyers must cope not only with the regulatory
morass presented by the environmental protection laws themselves, but
must frequently become enmeshed in issues of bankruptcy, constitu-
tional, corporate, insurance, international trade, and securities law. Like
environmental law, other areas of law have steadily evolved as public
demand for increased environmental protection has required the striking
of new balances between competing social policies. The resulting jungle
of overlapping legal rules and contexts is enough to make environmental
lawyers today nostalgic for the "wilderness of administrative law" that
greeted those pioneering environmental lawyers of the early 1970s. 1
While not wishing to detract from the deserved celebration of envi-
ronmental law, the focus of this Essay is decidedly different. It seeks to
understand environmental law better by examining an area of law in
which the process of assimilating environmental protection values into
rules of law has recently proven most difficult-criminal law. To be sure,
in no area of the law has the assimilation process been easy. Legal rules,
by their very nature, resist change because change itself undermines the
value of having a rule in the first instance. Yet the jump from the civil to
* Professor of Law, Washington University (St. Louis). I would like to thank Kathleen
Brickey for her helpful comments on an earlier draft. Unlike me, Professor Brickey is an
expert on corporate criminal law. Remaining errors are the result of my stubbornness rather
than her oversight.
1. See David Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Ad-
ministrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 612 (1970).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
the criminal arena has been especially problematic for environmental
protection, and promises to continue to be so.
It is, however, the very existence of such conflict that makes the
topic so academically promising. This is so in two discrete ways. First,
conflict is often more revealing than obscuring. Conflict exposes differ-
ences, often by their exaggeration. Hence, analysis of the causes of
contentiousness that have arisen recently in environmental criminal en-
forcement reveals problems affecting environmental protection law rele-
vant far beyond the peculiar issue of environmental crime. Second,
conflict suggests the need for reform and therefore its careful study pro-
vides an occasion to recommend ways around the current impasse in the
assimilation process.
To these ends, this Essay is divided into three parts. First, it de-
scribes the problems that currently threaten to overwhelm the federal
government's environmental criminal enforcement program. Following
presentation of some background material, this discussion focuses princi-
pally on investigations of recent allegations of governmental incompe-
tence and malfeasance in the administration of its environmental
criminal enforcement program. Second, it seeks to explain the causes of
these problems, with a heavy emphasis on how those causes both fit into
a broader historical context and relate to the sweeping way in which
Congress has defined crimes in federal environmental protection laws.
Finally, this Essay offers some tentative recommendations for breaking
the existing impasse that plagues the environmental criminal enforce-
ment effort.
I. THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES CONTROVERSY
Until relatively recently, the enforcement of environmental protec-
tion laws meant, without more, their civil enforcement. Although, his-
torically, there certainly have been instances of criminal prosecutions in
which the defendant's unlawful acts included environmental pollution,2
there was no systematic effort by either federal or state governments to
2. See, e.g., United States v. Alaska S. Packing Co. (In re La Merced), 84 F.2d 444 (9th
Cir. 1936) (allowing prosecution for water pollution from oil discharge into lake); Seacord v.
Illinois, 13 N.E. 194 (Ill. 1887) (allowing prosecution for air pollution from hog rendering
tanks); State v. Taylor, 29 Ind. 517 (1868) (allowing prosecution for water pollution from
urinating into public spring); State v. Buckman, 8 N.H. 203 (1836) (allowing prosecution for
water pollution from dumping of animal carcass into drinking well); Commonwealth v. Yost,
11 Pa. Super. 323 (1899) (allowing prosecution for water pollution from privy upstream from
water company), rev'd, 197 Pa. 171 (1900). See generally CHRISTOPHER HARRIS ET AL., EN-
VIRONMENTAL CRIMES ch. 1 (1992) (discussing prosecution of pollution-related offenses in
nineteenth century).
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utilize criminal sanctions on behalf of environmental protection goals.
Although Congress routinely included criminal sanctions in each of the
major environmental laws that it has enacted since the 1970s,3 the federal
environmental criminal enforcement program remained largely mori-
bund prior to the mid-1980s.
Federal litigation resources were principally devoted to defending
the executive branch's implementation of its huge statutory responsibili-
ties as the regulated community, affected states, and the environmental
community consistently challenged agency programs in court.4 Because
of their inherently discretionary nature, enforcement efforts typically
took a backseat to defensive litigation, to which the federal government
had no choice but to respond. When, moreover, the federal government
did initiate enforcement actions, these actions were almost exclusively
civil in character.
In the mid- to late 1970s, the Department of Justice (Department)
undertook a few publicized prosecutions for violations of environmental
protection laws in order to establish at least the threat of criminal en-
forcement.' Several years later, the Department commenced a program-
matic effort within what was then the Department's Land and Natural
Resources Division, now the Environment and Natural Resources Divi-
sion (Environment Division). The Department did so by creating an En-
vironmental Crimes Unit (now a Section) within the Environment
Division, which would be concerned exclusively with criminal prosecu-
tions arising under the federal environmental protection laws.' The En-
vironment Division intended lawyers within that Section to possess the
expertise in environmental law necessary both to prosecute environmen-
3. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136j (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992);
Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); Oil Pollution Act
of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (Supp. IV 1993); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h-
2, 300i-1 (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d)-(e)
(West 1983); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (Supp. III 1991); Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b), (d) (1988).
4. See Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty
Years of Law and Politics, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 249, 256-76.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Frezzo Bros., 461 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Pa. 1978), a f'd, 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir.
1979), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983); United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp.
1181 (D. Ariz. 1975). See generally Judson W. Starr, Turbulent Times at Justice and EPA:
The Origins of Environmental Criminal Prosecutions and the Work that Remains, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 900, 905-06 (1991) (discussing prosecution of particularly egregious conduct
involving discharge of pollutants in violation of Clean Water Act).
6. Joseph G. Block, Environmental Criminal Enforcement in the 1990's, 3 VILL. ENVTL.
L.J. 33, 34 (1992); Starr, supra note 5, at 910.
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tal cases themselves and to assist federal prosecutors in the offices of the
United States Attorney interested in such cases.
At the behest of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
the Department, Congress also took a series of deliberate steps designed
to promote environmental criminal prosecutions. Congress added new
environmental crimes to existing statutes7 and significantly increased the
criminal penalties associated with the violation of federal environmental
statutes,8 partly to send the message to the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI) as well as to the regulated communities that environmental
crimes were now a priority for federal law enforcement. Congress also
conferred new investigatory authorities on the EPA and substantially in-
creased the EPA's related resources for the specific purpose of enhancing
the federal criminal prosecution effort.9
There have apparently been concrete results. According to the De-
partment, between fiscal years 1983 and 1993, the Department "has re-
corded environmental criminal indictments against 911 corporations and
individuals, and 686 guilty pleas and convictions have been entered. A
total of $212,408,903 in criminal penalties has been assessed. More than
388 years of imprisonment have been imposed of which nearly 191 years
account for actual confinement." 10
In 1983 the EPA had only twenty-three criminal investigators. By
1990 the EPA's criminal enforcement program had increased to 110 peo-
ple, including forty-seven special agents.Ii Under the Pollution Prosecu-
tion Act, which Congress enacted in 1990, the number of special agents
is supposed to quadruple by 1995.12 Similar increases in personnel are
7. See, e.g., Water Quality Act of 1987, § 312, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7, 42-45
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1988)); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976, § 3007, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 6927(b)(2) (West 1983)); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, §§ 101,
113(c)(5), 104 Stat. 2399, 2675-77 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(d), 7413).
8. See, e.g., Water Quality Act of 1987, § 312, 101 Stat. at 42-45; The Hazardous and
Solid Waste Act Amendments of 1984, § 232, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, 3256-57
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1988)); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
§§ 101, 133(c), 104 Stat. at 2675-77.
9. See Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990, §§ 201-205, Pub. L. No. 101-593, 104 Stat.
2954, 2962-63 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (Supp. IV 1992)).
10. Memorandum from Peggy Hutchins, Paralegal, U.S. Department of Justice, to Neil S.
Cartusciello, Chief, Environmental Crimes Section, U.S. Department of Justice (May 27,
1992) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review); see also OFFICE OF CRIMINAL EN-
FORCEMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 1990, at 3-2 (1991) (offering statistics of environmental criminal en-
forcement for fiscal years 1982 through 1990).
11. James M. Strock, Environmental Criminal Enforcement Priorities for the 1990s, 59
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 916, 918 (1991).
12. Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990, § 202(a), 104 Stat. at 2962.
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evident at the Department. There were three lawyers in the Environ-
mental Crimes Unit when it commenced operations in 1983.13 Currently
there are approximately thirty-one lawyers in that Section, all of whom
devote their time exclusively to the criminal enforcement of environmen-
tal laws. 4 Several United States Attorneys' offices across the country
now also include at least one federal criminal prosecutor who spends all
or a substantial portion of his or her time exclusively on environmental
protection matters. 15
Finally, the FBI has been devoting increasing resources to environ-
mental criminal prosecutions. The number of cases on which FBI special
agents worked increased from thirty-six to 450 between 1984 and 1992.16
In 1991 FBI special agents devoted more than 143,000 work hours to
environmental crimes investigations.7
Such statistics would appear to suggest both past achievement and
future promise. The federal environmental criminal enforcement pro-
gram, however, is currently in utter disarray amidst a flurry of accusa-
tions and counteraccusations between the regulated community and the
Department, Congress and the Department, the Department and the
EPA, the Department and United States Attorneys' offices, and attor-
neys within the Environmental Crimes Section itself. The accusations
fall into two somewhat paradoxical categories: (1) claims that the Envi-
ronmental Crimes Section has overzealously prosecuted individuals
based on technical, relatively harmless violations of the law; 8 and (2)
claims that the Section has failed to prosecute meritorious cases.' 9
13. Starr, supra note 5, at 910.
14. Michael Isikoff, Reno Probes Environmental Crimes Unit, WASH. POST, June 16, 1993,
at A12.
15. See Block, supra note 6, at 34.
16. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 2, at Int-3; see also Roger J. Marzulla & Brett G. Kappel,
Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide: Criminal Liability for Violations of Environmental Statutes
in the 1990s, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 201, 208 (1991) (discussing Department of Justice's
high conviction rate for environmental crimes).
17. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 2, at Int-3.
18. See, e.g., The Ellen Pardon, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1993, at A10; EPA's Most Wanted,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1992, at A16; H. Jane Lehman, Trials and Tribulations of Landowners,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1992, at K2; Property Busters, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 1990, at A14;
Wetlands Conviction Stirring Heated Debate, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1993, at F6.
19. See, e.g., William T. Hassler, Congressional Oversight of Federal Environmental Prose-
cutions: The Trashing of Environmental Crimes, 24 Envtl. L. Rptr. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,074,
10,075-77 (Feb. 16, 1994); John H. Cushman, Jr., Justice Department Is Criticized Over Envi-
ronmental Cases, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 30, 1992, at A16; Sharon LaFraniere, EPA Officials Criti-
cize Justice Dept.: 6 Tell House Panel Polluters Unpunished, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1992, at
A4; Keith Schneider, $11 Million Pollution Fine Too Soft?, N.Y. TIME, June 3, 1993, at
D22; Matthew L. Wald, House Panel to Seek Subpoenas Over Settlement of H-Bomb Case,
April 1994]
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Several congressional committees and subcommittees have re-
sponded by investigating the work of the Environmental Crimes Section.
A few have considered claims of overzealousness.2" But most-led by
Representatives Dingell, Schumer, and Wolpe (who has since left Con-
gress)-have been exploring the merits of accusations that Department
incompetence and malfeasance have prompted the Department in some
instances to allow defendants to plead guilty to far less serious offenses
than the evidence would have sustained and, in others, to decline alto-
gether to prosecute well-documented, serious violations of environmental
protection laws.2
These committees have held hearings that have focused on many of
the same cases. The Department's handling of its prosecution of
Rockwell International regarding management of the Department of En-
ergy's Rocky Flats nuclear weapon facility is likely the most well-known.
In that case the grand jury made public its affirmative desire to indict
Rockwell and individual officers and employees for offenses far more se-
rious than the five felony and five misdemeanor counts-against
Rockwell alone-that the Department accepted in a plea bargain with
Rockwell. The United States Attorney, at the behest of "Main Justice"
officials in Washington, D.C., ultimately declined to sign the grand jury's
proffered indictment.22
Another matter receiving widespread attention involves the Depart-
ment's handling of its prosecution of PureGro Company, an agricultural
chemical application and distribution company located in the state of
Washington. A death allegedly resulted from PureGro's disposing of
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1992, at AI5; Matthew L. Wald, Lawmakers Call Bomb Plant Prosecu-
tion Too Lenient, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1993, at A9.
20. See, e.g., Status of the Nation's Wetlands and Laws Related Thereto, Hearings Before
the Subcomm. of Water Resources of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation,
101st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 930-58, 1024-41, 1094-164 (1991).
21. See Environmental Crimes Act of 1992, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crimes and
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 126-30 (1993)
[hereinafter Schumer Hearings]; EPA 's Criminal Enforcement Program, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Dingell Hearings]; Environmental Crimes at
the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Facility, Documents Before the Subcomm. on Investigations
and Oversight, of the House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
vols. I-I (1992) [hereinafter Wolpe Hearings]; John D. Dingell, Opening Statement Before the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Com-
merce (Nov. 3, 1993) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review); Jonathon Turley, The
George Washington Univ. Nat'l Law Ctr., Preliminary Report on Criminal Environmental
Prosecution by the United States Department of Justice, (Oct. 19, 1992) [hereinafter Turley
Report] (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
22. See Barry Siegel, Showdown at Rocky Flats (pts. 1 & 2), L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1993
(magazine), at 12, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1993 (magazine), at 22.
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hazardous waste on land in violation of federal law. The Department
permitted PureGro to plead guilty to a misdemeanor with a small fine
although reportedly the defendant initially had been willing to plead
guilty to a felony count.2 3
The Department, the EPA, and state government officials have testi-
fied at these congressional hearings, as have members of the public who
are angry at what they perceive to be the Department's failure to seek
heavy criminal sanctions for environmental violations in their communi-
ties. The EPA and state government officials have sometimes joined in
criticizing Department prosecutorial decisions before Congress.2 4 Ac-
cordingly, relations between the Department's Environmental Crimes
Section and EPA enforcement personnel are strained (at best).2' And
relations between that Section and the United States Attorneys' offices
are no better, because Assistant United States Attorneys have been com-
plaining (apparently sometimes to Congress) that the Section's Chief and
his deputies have declined to authorize their prosecution of meritorious
cases.
26
Within the Environmental Crimes Section itself, there is likewise
great division and personal bitterness. Some career lawyers assert that
they will no longer work on controversial environmental cases. Some
staff lawyers contend that Section leadership lacks the environmental law
expertise necessary to supervise and judge the merits of proposed prose-
cutions. 27 Those with supervisory responsibility respond that many staff
lawyers lack the criminal law litigation expertise required to render that
same judgment. Internal strife has persisted rather than dissipated over
time, especially now that the Section is itself the subject of two focused
inquiries: (1) an internal investigation being undertaken within the De-
partment itself; and (2) Representative Dingell's continuing probe in
which he is asking to interview career lawyers and, if refused, to use the
congressional power of subpoena to require their testimony.28
23. See 1992 Dingell Hearings, supra note 21, at 25; Turley Report, supra note 21, at 39-
70.
24. 1992 Dingell Hearings, supra note 21, at 82-198.
25. Linda Himelstein, DOJ's Environmental Mess, LEGAL TIMES WASH., July 20, 1992, at
1, 22-23.
26. Turley Report, supra note 21, at 14-16, 25-27; Himelstein, supra note 25, at 22-23.
27. Turley Report, supra note 21, at 17-21; Himelstein, supra note 25, at 23.
28. Isikoff, supra note 14, at A12; Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Copley, Hill to Examine
Environmental Prosecutions, NAT'L L.J., June 28, 1993, at 5; see also Linda Himelstein, Justice
Probing Its Environmental-Crimes Chief, LEGAL TiM-S WASH., June 28, 1993, at 2 (discussing
allegations of ethical breaches of Section Chief and other officials and whether congressional
investigations would conflict with policy of protecting prosecutors' discretion). The Depart-
ment of Justice released the results of its internal inquiry just as this Essay was going to press.
April 1994]
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No congressional committee has yet to issue a formal committee re-
port on the controversy, but the early returns are sharply critical of the
Department. As chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investiga-
tions of the House Committee on Science, Space and Technology, former
Representative Wolpe studied the prosecution at Rocky Flats and, in a
report released in January 1993, faulted Main Justice's conservatism in
impeding the more aggressive efforts of prosecutors in the field to secure
significant criminal sanctions.2 9 Wolpe also identified what he perceived
to be a double standard that allowed federal agency personnel to engage
in unlawful activity without being subject to federal prosecution.3
Representative Dingell has likewise contended that there are "seri-
ous management and performance problems plaguing the criminal en-
forcement program. ' 31 In an earlier letter to the Attorney General, he
asserted that his committee staff had "uncovered deeply troubling allega-
tions suggesting that certain elements at the Environmental Crimes Sec-
tion at the Department of Justice have disrupted and undermined the
EPA's criminal enforcement program."' 32 More particularly, Dingell has
advanced several serious charges, including
the declination of prosecution under highly questionable cir-
cumstances (including the strenuous protests of the line attor-
neys and case agents involved), the apparently preferential
treatment of certain large and powerful corporations, the re-
fusal to pursue the prosecution of individuals implicated in en-
vironmental crimes in cases where such individuals were
See WILLIAM J. CORCORAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INTERNAL REVIEW OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES PROGRAM: REPORT TO THE AsSOCI-
ATE ATTORNEY GENERAL (1994). The conclusions of this report are briefly discussed infra
note 66.
29. Howard Wape, House Comm. on Science, Space and Technology, Report on the Pros-
ecution of Environmental Crimes at the Department of Energy's Rocky Flats Facility, 20 (Jan.
4, 1993) [hereinafter Wolpe Report] (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). In a
recent article, Bill Hassler, a former Environmental Crimes Section lawyer and member of the
Rocky Flats Prosecution Team, criticizes both the methods of investigation and conclusions of
the congressional committees and their investigators. See Hassler, supra note 19, at 10,077-87.
Hassler emphasizes the failure of congressional critics to interview all decision makers in-
volved prior to making their allegations, the absence of evidence to support their characteriza-
tions of the prosecutorial decisions they challenge, and ironically, their politicization of federal
criminal enforcement. Id.
30. Wolpe Report, supra note 29, at 20.
31. Memorandum from John Dingell, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investi-
gations, to Members, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 1 (Sept. 9, 1992) [herein-
after Dingell Memorandum] (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
32. Letter from John Dingell, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, to William P. Barr, Attorney General 2 (July 6,
1992) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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associated with major corporations or represented by certain
well-connected attorneys, the convening at Main Justice of
closed-door meetings with defense counsel without the knowl-
edge of the EPA or the local U.S. Attorney's office, and the
ready agreement to trivial financial penalties in cases involving
serious and long-standing environmental violations.33
Finally, a preliminary report prepared for Representative Schumer
is equally critical of the Department's performance. The report found
evidence of the following: (1) "a pronounced failure to prosecute envi-
ronmental crimes to the same degree as conventional crimes... [and] to
prosecute individuals";34 (2) "deep divisions and mistrust between the
Environmental Crimes Section and various United States Attorneys' of-
fices";35 (3) "chronic case mismanagement"; 36 and (4) "possible political
influence in both individual cases and general policies within the Envi-
ronmental Crimes Section."
37
II. THE ROOTS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES CONTROVERSY
A. D&ad Vu All Over Again?
For observers of environmental policy making over the past twenty-
five years, much about the environmental crimes controversy seems all
too familiar. To be sure, environmental crime has not previously been
the subject of such great public attention and crisis atmosphere. But this
current crisis nonetheless seems to share much in common with a series
of such controversies that have plagued environmental law during the
past twenty years, ranging from the much publicized Kepone incident in
the early 1970s to Anne Gorsuch's tenure as EPA Administrator in the
early 1980s.3 '
33. Id.
34. Turley Report, supra note 21, at 5.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 6.
37. Id. The General Accounting Office recently released its prepared testimony on the
environmental crimes enforcement program for a hearing chaired by Representative Dingell
this past November. See L. Nye Stevens, Environmental Crime: Issues Related to Justice's
Criminal Prosecution of Environmental Offenses, Testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Energy and Commerce (Nov. 3, 1993) (on
file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
38. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of
Federal Environmental Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 311 (describing
"pathological cycle" of public and institutional distrust of EPA that results in EPA failure and
breeds further distrust); Christopher H. Schroeder, Cool Analysis Versus Moral Outrage in the
Development of Federal Environmental Criminal Law, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 251 (1993)
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As public aspirations for environmental protection, which have been
uncompromising, have collided with the public's unwillingness to pay the
costs associated with that change, the various parts of the federal govern-
ment associated with implementing environmental protection policy have
frequently become objects of public criticism and even scorn. These in-
clude criticisms both from those- who believe that the government has
failed to achieve promised pollution reductions as well as from those who
believe that the government is imposing unnecessarily high clean-up
costs on society. Moreover, because environmental restrictions often are
based on uncertain scientific information, require significant economic
dislocations, and relate to highly charged public health matters, there is
typically much fodder for critics from either perspective.39
The fragmented nature of environmental policy making provides
further fuel for controversy. The executive and legislative branches of
the federal government have maintained different perspectives on many
of these issues, as have the EPA and the Department, the headquarters of
these agencies in Washington, D.C., and their branch offices across the
country. As a result, the initial source for much of the criticism
launched at one part of the government is, more often than not, another
part of the government.
No doubt the greatest source of friction between governmental insti-
tutions has persisted between Congress and the executive branch. The
tension between the executive and legislative branches in environmental
law making is longstanding. The early Nixon years established a culture
of congressional suspicion regarding the willingness of the executive
branch to undertake a good faith effort to implement the ambitious envi-
ronmental protection laws Congress was enacting. That culture remains
fairly dominant in Congress today, almost twenty-five years later, and
largely explains how quickly certain congressional subcommittees hold
oversight hearings to second guess executive branch motives in the for-
mulation of environmental policy.'
There is, in fact, reason for congressional concern. A philosophical
split has persisted between the two branches of government on environ-
mental issues during the past twenty-five years. While Congress has en-
acted laws largely reflective of the nation's aspirations regarding
(describing environmental crimes controversy as expression of ongoing, albeit submerged, de-
bate between two competing approaches to environmental policymaking).
39. Id. at 321-22, 347-48.
40. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, The Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of
EPA: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes (Who Shall Watch the Watchers Themselves)?, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 205, 214-19 (criticizing "EPA bashing" and certain con-
gressional representatives' swift public denunciation of EPA mistakes).
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environmental protection, the executive branch has been more responsive
to those concerned about the economic and social costs of implementing
those laws.41
The upshot has been a steady supply of interbranch feuding. The
EPA, often prompted-or compelled-by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), has frequently construed congressional enactments to al-
low for greater consideration of economic cost than the plain meaning of
the statutory language would seem to suggest is permissible. Congres-
sional critics denounce the executive branch in the press, hold oversight
hearings to attract further public attention, and otherwise seek to use
their considerable leverage-through confirmation authority or the budg-
etary process-to persuade the executive branch to reverse its position.42
The two branches view these disputes quite differently. The execu-
tive branch sees them largely as simple "policy disputes" and congres-
sional criticism as simply "politics as usual." Many in Congress,
however, adopt a far dimmer view. They contend that the executive
branch, by not fully utilizing the reach of the law as enacted, is itself
acting unlawfully.
Rarely, however, have these persistent, simmering interbranch dis-
putes developed into full-fledged conflagrations. One reason why that
likely occurred in the case of environmental crime is also why it likely
occurred during the tenure of Anne Gorsuch as EPA Administrator.
The executive branch must possess a certain modicum of credibility to
withstand the pressures in the environmental policy arena, particularly
those pressures generated by the press reporting on congressional claims
of executive branch malfeasance or on disputes within the executive
branch itself. Any significant corroboration of the merits of congres-
sional or regional agency office suspicion of an executive branch "sell
out" to-or "sweetheart deal" with-industry invariably unleashes an
avalanche of media attention and public outcry.43
Administrator Gorsuch triggered just such an avalanche with a se-
ries of missteps, beginning with her close relationship with Interior Sec-
retary James Watt, that suggested the realization of Congress's worst
fears regarding industry capture of the EPA.44 Largely because the EPA
since has had a series of exceptionally respected and credible Administra-
41. See id. at 222-26.
42. Id. at 210-18.
43. Apparently in anticipation of this public perception problem, and perhaps in response
to the problems currently facing the Department, EPA Administrator Carol Browner is re-
portedly drafting a memorandum advising all agency political appointees to avoid becoming
involved in individual enforcement cases.
44. Lazarus, supra note 38, at 345-47.
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tors-William Ruckelshaus, Lee Thomas, William Reilly-no controver-
sies of a similarly overwhelming magnitude have plagued the EPA.
Those Administrators possessed the credibility needed to respond to con-
gressional criticism and to explain themselves and their differing perspec-
tives even in the face of heated controversy.
The environmental crimes controversy occurred when (during the
second half of the Bush Administration) and where (within the Depart-
ment) it did partly because the Environment Division lacked that essen-
tial modicum of credibility.45 It is not yet clear the extent to which the
Environment Division's political leadership actually intended to signal
career lawyers to scrutinize more closely recommendations to criminally
prosecute the violation of federal environmental protection laws, or
whether those political appointees, as some claim, 46 actively discouraged
criminal investigations of environmental violations. Within a bureau-
cracy, however, not much is required to send a message of emphasis or
deemphasis to career staff. And, when resources are stretched thin, an
implicit signal of a mere shift in priorities may have a significant practical
impact.
What is increasingly clear, however, is that regardless of the extent
to which the environmental crimes controversy resulted from smoke
rather than fire,47 the Environment Division's corresponding lack of
credibility proved dispositive. The Environment Division could not
credibly refute accusations that close prosecutorial decisions resulted
from undue political influence rather than from neutral decisions of ca-
reer lawyers. Without the benefit of the doubt, virtually all of the Envi-
ronment Division's exercise of prosecutorial discretion became tainted by
claims of possible political motivation.
Unless Department officials can credibly explain the reasons for a
decision not to prosecute in a particular case, the public and Congress are
likely to suspect the worst. Because such credibility was lacking, suspi-
cion instead begot further suspicion, until the entire environmental
crimes program was ultimately overwhelmed by intense public scrutiny
and criticism. The Bush Administration proved that it had forgotten the
lesson of the Gorsuch era under Reagan, which is that Congress and the
public will not tolerate executive branch efforts-or even the appearance
of efforts-to undermine environmental protection programs.
45. The principal period at issue was between the spring of 1991 and the spring of 1992,
when the Acting Assistant Attorney General was Barry Hartman.
46. See Dingell Memorandum, supra note 31, at 1-2; Turley Report, supra note 21, at 6-
25; Wolpe Report, supra note 29, at 12-16.
47. See Hassler, supra note 19, at 10,077-87.
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What made the environmental crimes controversy perhaps even less
tenable and therefore more volatile, however, was its location in the De-
partment. A prosecutor's decision not to prosecute is generally assumed
to be far removed, if not totally insulated, from the whims of electoral
politics. History may suggest this claim to be more fictional than real.
But, even if so, it is a fiction that can prove costly to those who challenge
it too overtly. The environmental crimes program is now paying that
high price.
B. The Problem with Environmental Crime
The lessons to be learned from the environmental crimes contro-
versy, however, run far deeper than policy conflicts between the
executive branch and Congress. Nor are they confined to the pitfalls as-
sociated with a few political appointees unwittingly fueling decades of
congressional distrust of the executive branch's willingness to enforce en-
vironmental requirements. They extend instead to how Congress has de-
fined environmental crimes in the environmental pollution control laws
and the institutional collisions fostered by that legislative approach.
The argument in favor of criminal sanctions in environmental pro-
tection laws is fairly straightforward and compelling-indeed deceptively
so. First, the harms that environmental laws seek to prevent can be just
as significant, and sometimes even more so, than those implicated by
more traditional criminal acts. For instance, pollution of a public drink-
ing water supply can imperil the health, even with fatal results, of an
entire community. Just because the wrongdoer has done so by way of an
environmental medium-such as air or water-does not make that con-
duct any less deserving of criminal sanction.48 Environmental law, there-
fore, is not simply another kind of economic regulation. It is more often
akin to public health and safety law in its basic thrust.
Second, the moral culpability of those who violate environmental
laws can be as great as those who commit any of the more traditional
common-law-based crimes, such as murder, robbery, or assault. Individ-
uals who violate environmental laws may do so for reasons no more justi-
fiable and no less reprehensible than those motivating the most venal of
criminals. Certainly, the fact that many violators of environmental laws
do so to maximize profits does not make their conduct less culpable, nor
48. See KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND
MATERIALS 477 n.1 (1990) (citing Department of Justice study finding that "public ranked
knowingly polluting a city's water supply as more serious than heroin smuggling, if the pollu-
tion caused twenty people to become ill but not sick enough to require medical treatment").
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does it distinguish environmental crimes from many other crimes that
have long been subject to harsh criminal sanctions.
Finally, absent the possibility of criminal sanctions, particularly
those directed at individuals (including corporate officers), companies
may view sanctions for violating environmental laws as a mere cost of
doing business. Companies can gamble that the government enforcers
will not discover their violations and, even if that gamble fails, offset
those costs by the excess profits they gained through past noncompliance.
Depending on market conditions, companies that are sanctioned may
also be able to pass through to consumers the costs of any civil penalties
by charging more for their goods and services. And, when such charges
cannot be passed through, the company may even choose to declare
bankruptcy to gain a fresh start.
Criminal sanctions, however, do not suffer from these same limita-
tions. The mere threat of their imposition makes corporate officers take
notice. Prison sentences can apply to officers and employees in their per-
sonal capacities. They are not simply a cost of doing business-their im-
pact can be devastating. The moral stigma associated with a criminal
conviction can, standing alone, irreparably destroy not only existing and
future economic relations, but social and familial relations as well.
49
The economic effect of criminal sanctions imposed on a corporate
entity rather than on an individual can likewise be more devastating than
civil penalties. Business can suffer from the stigma of a conviction and
there may also be collateral consequences that flow from a conviction.
For instance, a conviction under many existing environmental laws sub-
jects the defendant company to "debarment," meaning that the company
is not eligible to enter into a contract with the federal government for a
specified time period. 0 For large companies, the impact of such a re-
striction is substantial, and for smaller companies, the impact can be
catastrophic.
49. See generally Susan Hedman, Expressive Functions of Criminal Sanctions in Environ-
mental Law, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 889 (1991); see also Webster L. Hubbell, Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Energy and
Commerce 2 (Nov. 3, 1993) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) ("Nothing works
better at getting managers to pay attention to environmental compliance than the prospect of
going to prison and the prospect of fines and other penalties for their companies.").
50. See, e.g., Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1368(a) (West 1986); Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7606 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). See generally David T. Buente et al., The "Civil"
Implications of Environmental Crime, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,589, 10,598-600
(Oct. 1993) (analyzing relationship between civil and criminal enforcement of environmental
laws).
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Congress responded positively to these arguments in favor of crimi-
nal sanctions by including criminal sanctions in almost all of the federal
environmental protection laws. The response was, however, also indis-
criminate: Congress made virtually all "knowing" and some "negligent"
violations of environmental pollution control standards, limitations, per-
mits, and licenses subject to criminal as well as to civil sanctions. Con-
gress made relatively little effort to define thresholds for when a
defendant's conduct justified adding the possibility of criminal sanctions
to civil penalties. Except for the knowing and negligent mens rea re-
quirements, Congress just assumed that the civil and criminal thresholds
should be precisely the same. The problems with such an assumption are
several.
First, the environmental standards are not set based on the existence
of traditional notions of criminal culpability. Violations of environmen-
tal laws may, of course, involve the most serious risks to human health
and of catastrophic, irreversible environmental damage. But the stan-
dards upon which those statutory violations are in fact based do not de-
pend on the existence of such risks or damage. They are instead set at far
more precautionary, risk-averse levels of protection against risks to
human health and the environment. The public-this Author in-
eluded-may believe that such precautionary levels are wise and appro-
priate, but that presents a far different public policy issue than whether
all such violations rise to a level justifying severe criminal as well as civil
sanctions. By simply equating the regulatory thresholds for civil and
criminal sanctions, however, Congress never directly addressed this
issue.
Congress, for the most part, has not been especially discriminating
in defining the mens rea requirements for environmental crimes. Instead,
consistent with the rationale that criminal sanctions serve regulatory de-
terrent purposes, Congress sought to maximize their deterrent effect by
deemphasizing mens rea elements for the imposition of criminal sanc-
tions. Hence, although the environmental statutes generally require
some mens rea for criminal prosecution-they are not simply strict liabil-
ity offenses s '-they do not require much at all in terms of the defendant's
knowledge of the actual risks of his or her activity. As a result,
51. Section 16 of the River and Harbor Act of 1899, however, does define a strict liability
environmental criminal offense. See 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1988). For a thoughtful discussion of
some of the problems posed by Congress's recent emphasis on strict liability crimes, and possi-
ble solutions, see Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes,
78 CORNELL L. REV. 401 (1993).
52. See, e.g., M. Diane Barber, Fair Warning: The Deterioration of Scienter Under Envi-
ronmental Criminal Statutes, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 105, 144-47 (1992); Kevin A. Gaynor et
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although persons who violate environmental laws may possess the most
venal and reprehensible of states of mind-and thus warrant the most
severe criminal sanction-the environmental criminal sanctions do not
require such a state of mind. 3
What makes such an approach to mens rea particularly problematic
in the environmental law context is that environmental standards, unlike
most traditional crimes, present questions of degree rather than of kind.
Murder, burglary, assault, and embezzlement are simply unlawful.
There is no threshold level below which such conduct is acceptable. In
contrast, pollution is not unlawful per se: In many circumstances, some
pollution is acceptable. It is only pollution that exceeds certain pre-
scribed levels that is unlawful. But, for that very reason, the mens rea
element should arguably be a more, not less, critical element in the prose-
cution of an environmental offense.
Finally, Congress failed to adequately account for the fact that the
civil standards are often set at an action-forcing level and are anything
but static. The standards do not necessarily reflect standards of perform-
ance that are either economically or technologically feasible. They do
not reflect existing conduct or long-settled cultural norms. They instead
are more likely to reflect policy makers' predictions of what will be possi-
ble and the public's aspirations for a cleaner environment. The under-
lying science is often very uncertain, and the regulations constantly
change in response to new information, court challenges, and sweeping
statutory amendments.
Full compliance with all applicable environmental laws is conse-
quently the exception rather than the norm. Just as the EPA rarely
meets congressional aspirations in meeting all of the deadlines in environ-
al., Environmental Criminal Prosecutions: Simple Fixes for a Flawed System, 3 VILL. ENVTL.
L.J. 1, 11-21 (1992); R. Christopher Locke, Environmental Crimes: The Absence of Intent and
the Complexities of Compliance, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 311 (1991); Ruth Ann Weidel et al.,
The Erosion of Mens Rea in Environmental Criminal Prosecutions, 21 SETON HALL L. REV.
1100 (1991); Lisa Ann Harig, Note, Ignorance Is Not Bliss: Responsible Corporate Officers
Convicted of Environmental Crimes and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 DUKE L.J. 145
(1992); Michael Vitiello, Note, Does Culpability Matter?: Statutory Construction Under 42
U.S.C. § 6928, 6 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 187, 214-29 (1993).
53. To be sure, many of the environmental statutes include a "knowing endangerment"
offense, which imposes even greater criminal sanctions on those violators who act with knowl-
edge of the significant risks they impose, see, e.g., Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1319(c)(3) (West 1986 & Supp. 1993); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C.A. § 6928(e) (West 1983); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (1988 & Supp. III 1992),
but the problems that have developed in the prosecution of environmental crimes have gener-
ally not resulted from these more demanding provisions. They instead result from the vague
delegations of prosecutorial discretion that inhere in those criminal provisions that lack such
requirements. See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 27:867
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES CONTROVERSY
mental laws-it meets roughly fourteen percent of all congressional
deadlines54-- industry rarely meets all of those aspirations as reflected in
the statutory and regulatory requirements themselves. Nor does govern-
ment itself or its contractors-as in Rocky Flats-strictly comply with
environmental requirements. In a recent survey, two-thirds of all corpo-
rate counsel reported that their companies have recently been in violation
of applicable environmental laws."
For that reason, however, there is a danger, indeed a potential im-
propriety, in Congress's approach to environmental criminal liability.
The question whether certain conduct warrants a criminal sanction is far
different than whether a civil sanction may be warranted, precisely be-
cause the latter is susceptible to being no more than an economic disin-
centive. Criminal liability standards should be more settled and less
dynamic. They should be more reflective of what in fact can be accom-
plished rather than of the public's aspirations of how, if pushed, the
world can change in the future.
Perhaps most importantly, criminal sanctions should also be tem-
pered by the gravity of the decision that certain conduct warrants the
most severe of sanctions. Criminal sanctions are not simply another en-
forcement tool in the regulator's arsenal to promote public policy objec-
tives.56 A criminal sanction is fundamentally different in character. The
reason why criminal sanctions have greater deterrent value is also the
reason why they- must be used more selectively. Criminal sanctions
should be reserved for the more culpable subset of offenses and not used
solely for their ability to deter.
To date, Congress, however, has made no meaningful or systematic
effort to consider criminal sanctions as presenting an issue distinct from
that presented by civil sanctions. Congress has not tried to identify those
54. Lazarus, supra note 38, at 324.
55. Marianne Lavelle, Environmental Vise: Law, Compliance, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 30, 1993,
at S1.
56. See generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, INT'L INST. FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, THE
CRIMINAL LAW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF ECONOMIC REGULATION (1976) (discussing social
costs of using criminal law as instrument of economic regulation); Harry V. Ball & Lawrence
M. Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A
Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197 (1964-65) (exploring relationship between popular
morality and use of criminal sanctions in regulating business practices); Henry M. Hart, Jr.,
The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958) (discussing institu-
tional considerations involved at various levels of decision making in criminal law); Sanford H.
Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regula-
tions, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1963) (outlining special characteristics of economic regulatory
legislation relevant to use of criminal sanctions); Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33
COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933) (discussing department of public welfare offenses that are punish-
able without any criminal intent).
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circumstances in which the culpability of conduct warrants taking the
next step of imposing criminal sanctions. Congress has not tried to iden-
tify those kinds of environmental standards for which criminal sanctions
are more appropriate. Nor has Congress focused as carefully as it should
on the mens rea issue.
Congress's failure to consider any of these issues provides the source
of much of the institutional conflict underlying the environmental crimes
controversy. By criminalizing far more conduct than it would expect to
be the subject of criminal enforcement, Congress has, in effect, delegated
all of the line-drawing issues to the executive branch without providing
any guidance on how that discretion should be exercised. No doubt
there are public policy areas in which such open-ended delegations are
workable, probably because the legislative branch is willing to trust the
executive branch's implementation and because there is otherwise some
shared understanding between and within those branches regarding how
that discretion should be exercised. When, however, neither such trust
nor such a shared understanding exists, an open-ended delegation can be
a recipe for disaster, especially when public health concerns are likely to
trigger substantial public scrutiny and second guessing.
The current environmental crimes debacle demonstrates just that
potential. The clear lesson of the past twenty-five years of environmental
law and policy making is that trust and shared understanding is sorely
lacking. Many in Congress, particularly those on the authorization com-
mittees that drafted the statutes, harbor deep suspicions of the willing-
ness of the executive branch to fully implement those laws precisely
because of the absence of shared understanding. Parts of the executive
branch, particularly within the Office of Management and Budget and
the White House,57 have frequently confirmed the validity of those suspi-
cions by expressing skepticism of the utility of literal application of envi-
ronmental laws.
The executive branch, moreover, has further exacerbated the prob-
lem in the environmental criminal context. Rather than fill the vacuum
left by Congress, the executive branch has failed to develop specific gui-
dance governing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the environ-
mental crimes area.58 Nor has the executive branch otherwise made
57. See generally Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight
of the Environmental Protection Agency, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 127
(exploring tension between rule of law and politics of regulation reflected in executive branch's
oversight of EPA).
58. The only forum in which some of these issues are currently being debated is before the
United States Sentencing Commission, which has for several years been developing organiza-
tional sentencing guidelines for environmental crimes. The sentencing debate, of course, does
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much effort to explain publicly its decision-making process in any sys-
tematic way.
Compounding matters, decision-making authority is fragmented be-
tween the EPA and the Department, and between regional and head-
quarters offices within both of those agencies. Those who initiate
investigations do not, for that reason, necessarily apply the same criteria
in evaluating a case that will ultimately be applied by those who make
the final decision whether to prosecute. Such discrepancies invite misun-
derstandings and controversy, particularly when, as has occurred in the
case of environmental crimes, those final prosecution decisions are made
in a high-handed fashion, without giving those most intimately involved
either the opportunity to participate or a written explanation of the final
decision.
The dispute within the Environmental Crimes Section itself is a mi-
crocosm of the entire problem. Lawyers whose expertise is in environ-
mental law bring a different perspective to their evaluation of a case than
not concern the nature of criminal conduct, but the related, antecedent issue of how to deter-
mine the appropriate level of punishment for different kinds of environmental criminal viola-
tions. The Sentencing Commission did not originally include environmental crimes in its 1991
organizational sentencing guidelines because of the contentiousness of the issues involved. See
Garry Sturgess, Environmental Crime Guidelines Postponed, LEGAL TIMES WASH., Apr. 15,
1991, at 7. The Sentencing Commission sought to break through the impasse that had im-
peded its work in this area by appointing an Advisory Working Group on Environmental
Sanctions, comprised of individuals bringing different expertise and perspectives (government,
industry, academic) to the issue. See Linda Himelstein, Sentencing Guidelines: A Punishing
Process, LEGAL TIMES WASH., Dec. 21, 1992, at 1. The Advisory Working Group issued its
working draft recommendations on March 5, 1993. See Memorandum from the Advisory
Working Group on Environmental Sanctions to Interested Members of the Public (Mar. 5,
1993) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). However, those recommendations
prompted an avalanche of criticism from industry as well as from government. See, e.g., U.S.
Dept. of Justice, Comments on Working Draft of Recommended Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations Convicted of Federal Environmental Crimes (May 10, 1993) (on file with
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review); Comments of Former Justice Department and EPA Offi-
cials on Draft Environmental Guidelines Prepared by Advisory Working Group on Environ-
mental Sanctions (Apr. 16, 1993) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review); see also Cris
Carmody, Proposed Guidelines for Environmental Crimes Irk Business, NAT'L L.J., May 3,
1993, at 19 (criticizing sentencing guidelines for organizations convicted of environmental
crimes). On November 16, 1993, the Advisory Working Group issued its revised draft recom-
mendations, which substantially amended its earlier draft in response to those comments. The
reasons for these delays and contentiousness are not unrelated to the problems currently facing
the entire environmental crimes program. The gulf separating those debating the merits of
criminal sanctions for environmental crimes is so great, and the consensus so thin, that agree-
ment has been exceedingly difficult to reach. Moreover, because Congress criminalized so
much potential conduct, the sentencing guidelines issues have become quite important and
very heated. The issues that should have been considered at the front end of the criminal
process-that is, whether specific conduct should be subject to criminal sanction in the first
instance-have instead been relegated to the sentencing phase.
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those whose expertise lies instead only in more traditional areas of crimi-
nal law. Environmental law experts tend to be more swayed-perhaps
too much so-by the deterrent value of prosecution and therefore more
willing to promote the broader liability theories. In contrast, the crimi-
nal experts tend to be more demanding-also perhaps too much so-in
their search for the kind of showing of criminal culpability that they are
used to having to establish in more traditional areas of criminal law.
Unfortunately, that clash of perspectives has been intensified, rather
than mitigated, in the Environmental Crimes Section because there are
few within the Section possessing the dual expertise required to bridge
the gap. There are instead two distinct camps. Those in leadership posi-
tions possess principal expertise in criminal, not environmental, law,
while the career staff tend to have the opposite emphasis. The upshot has
been constant clashes of view regarding how to proceed between the two
camps within the Section, with those "criminal lawyers" in leadership
positions being more skeptical of some of the more aggressive enforce-
ment theories propounded by the career "environmental lawyers."
Moreover, when Section leadership has decided not to authorize rec-
ommended prosecutions, it has lacked the credibility to have its decisions
readily accepted within the government itself, let alone by interested
members of the general public. Career lawyers within the Section and
EPA officials in both the headquarters and the regions fault those deci-
sions for not reflecting an accurate understanding of environmental law.
The United States Attorneys' offices do not react any more favora-
bly when Main Justice closely scrutinizes and sometimes refuses to ap-
prove their requests to initiate an environmental crimes prosecution. The
United States Attorneys and their assistants naturally resist being second
guessed by Main Justice on criminal matters. 9 In most areas those gov-
ernment prosecutors are fairly autonomous when it comes to deciding
whether to initiate a prosecution; prior approval from Main Justice is not
required. Environmental crimes is one of the exceptions to that rule.'
59. See, e.g., Breckinridge L. Willcox, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations, House Committee on Energy and Commerce (Nov. 3, 1993) (on file with
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review); Robert J. Wortham, Testimony Before the Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Energy and Commerce (Nov. 3, 1993)
(on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
60. In his recent testimony before the House, Associate Attorney General Hubbell sought
to dispel the notion that the degree of control exercised by Main Justice over environmental
criminal matters was out of step with the Department's traditional approach to other areas.
See Hubbell, supra note 49, at 10-14. Hubbell testified that "the U.S. Attorneys Offices have
significantly broader responsibilities for environmental crimes than they have in other highly
complex regulatory areas such as tax and antitrust," id., and that in the civil and civil rights
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The reason for that exception also supplies the reason why so much
antagonism has recently resulted between Main Justice and the United
States Attorneys' offices. The rationale for the preapproval requirement
is that environmental law is such a new and complex area of law that it is
necessary to have those who possess environmental law expertise review
prosecution recommendations to ensure quality control and to avoid ad-
verse precedent. When, however, such centralized review is conducted
by those in leadership positions who do not possess such expertise, the
United States Attorneys are less accepting of adverse determinations.
When, moreover, the specter of improper political influence is added to
the equation-as occurred during the last few years of the Bush Admin-
istration-what might have been simply "less accepting" can be quickly
transformed into accusations of incompetence or even malfeasance.
III. ASSIMILATING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
INTO CRIMINAL LAW
Environmental law has assimilated so poorly into criminal law be-
cause environmental policy makers have done a commensurately poor
job of considering the distinct values, purposes, and limitations of crimi-
nal law. Assimilation requires give and take, as the values, purposes, and
limitations of each legal context responds to the other. Bankruptcy and
environmental law, for instance, have been undergoing just such a pro-
cess of assimilation during the past decade;61 the evolution of the laws of
standing,62 property, 63 equitable remedies,64 and securities law,65 among
others, could be similarly characterized.
By contrast, criminal law has simply been seen as another way to
achieve environmental policy objectives by maximizing the law's poten-
tial for deterrence. The executive and legislative branches have not been
divisions "the approval of the relevant Assistant Attorney General is necessary in a variety of
designated areas before a U.S. Attorney can take significant action in a criminal matter," id.
61. See generally Kathryn R. Heidt, Environmental Obligations in Bankruptcy: A Funda-
mental Framework, 44 U. FLA. L. REy. 153 (1992) (addressing problems with environmental
obligations in bankruptcy that confront courts).
62. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2146-47 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
Injuries, and Article III, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 163 (1992) (discussing justifiability of invalidating
congressional grant of standing without investigating relevant history).
63. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2903 (1992) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
64. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987); Daniel A. Farber,
Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental Injunctions, 45 U. PrrT. L. REV. 513
(1984).
65. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. International Paper Co., 985 F.2d 1190
(2d Cir. 1993).
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carefully considering the character of particular environmental regula-
tions (for example, health and safety versus economic) or the distinct
values, purposes, and limitations of criminal law in defining federal envi-
ronmental crimes. Both branches need to revisit those issues now.
Congress needs to replace the existing indiscriminate broad-brush
approach by defining environmental crimes in ways that better establish
criminal culpability and better identify the kind of conduct that Congress
in fact expects to be prosecuted criminally. This should allow for a more
effective and fair criminal enforcement program that is better focused on
those instances deserving of severe criminal sanction. The result should
not be less environmental criminal prosecution, but more, because of the
advantages of focusing prosecutorial resources on the biggest problem
areas.
The executive branch likewise needs to reform its approach, espe-
cially given the existing vacuum of settled prosecution criteria. Working
together, the Department and the EPA need to establish guidelines and
formal interagency memoranda of understanding that reflect a shared
understanding of when circumstances justify supplementing civil en-
forcement with criminal sanctions. Under the current system, those who
make that initial determination do not apply the same criteria that is
applied by those who make the ultimate decision whether to prosecute
several years later. As a result, years of limited investigatory resources
are wasted, and ultimately the goodwill of government employees is lost.
To that same end, there needs to be better coordination generally
between civil and criminal enforcement efforts, consistent, of course,
with grand jury secrecy limitations that apply to criminal proceedings.
There are currently two parallel tracks and virtually no interaction. A
decision, for instance, not to pursue a criminal prosecution does not au-
tomatically trigger an immediate inquiry whether to bring a civil enforce-
ment action instead. The case just ends.
There is likewise little effort to involve the public in the decision-
making process. Criminal prosecutors are traditionally reluctant to com-
municate with the public regarding prosecutorial decisions. And there
are generally good reasons for that reluctance to engage in a dialogue
that risks trying a case in the media rather than in a court of law. When,
however, as frequently occurs with allegations of environmental crime,
the public harbors significant fears about related health and safety mat-
ters, the government has an added responsibility to address those public
concerns. The government cannot simply decline comment on those
matters. The government must, to be sure, avoid prejudicing any pend-
ing enforcement actions. But it should be able to do so without remain-
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ing completely silent about existing hazards. In addition, when the case
is over, particularly when the government has decided to decline prose-
cution, the government must make extra efforts to explain its decision
making to the public, while adhering to grand jury secrecy limitations.
Finally, the Department needs to reform the Environmental Crimes
Section itself. One reason why the Section is functioning so poorly is that
it stopped serving its original purpose. The justification for such a sec-
tion within the Environment Division was based on the need to have a
primary environmental focus. Environmental laws are complex and re-
quire expertise that the United States Attorneys do not always possess or
have the time to obtain. Criminal enforcement must also be closely coor-
dinated with civil enforcement, particularly to the extent that judicial
precedent interpreting statutory language in one context necessarily af-
fects enforcement actions in the other.
These justifications remain sound, yet the Section no longer serves
those ends. Most simply put, it makes no sense to have Section leader-
ship versed primarily in criminal and not environmental law. The Sec-
tion might as well be in the Criminal Division because, as has in fact
happened, the reasons for an Environmental Crimes Section are not real-
ized. Rather than a section of environmental criminal experts, it has suf-
fered a split between Section leadership and its career staff. In addition,
the coordination between the leadership of Environmental Crimes Sec-
tion and those in the Environmental Enforcement Section responsible for
civil enforcement has been virtually nonexistent. Their perspectives and
priorities are too different. Those in United States Attorneys' offices like-
wise have had little reason to defer to Section leadership and more reason
to rebel at having to obtain approval from them prior to bringing a case.
It is absolutely essential, therefore, that the Section be headed by those
with significant environmental law and criminal law backgrounds. It is
likewise essential that those heading the civil and criminal enforcement
efforts in the Environment Division coordinate their approaches to statu-
tory construction generally and to specific cases in particular.
In addition, the Department needs to recognize that as individual
federal prosecutors in its regional offices gain expertise in environmental
law, those prosecutors are entitled to greater autonomy in their work.
The Environmental Crimes Section model presumes a lack of such exper-
tise and, on that basis, centralizes control in Washington, D.C., much to
the chagrin of those in United States Attorneys' offices. But the ultimate
success of the Environmental Crimes Section depends on its imparting
environmental law expertise to those United States Attorneys' offices.
For that reason, when such expertise is obtained, the Section should not
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resist or disparage it, but reward it on a case-by-case, or attorney-by-
attorney, basis.
Presently, for instance, there are identifiable, experienced federal
criminal prosecutors in the field who possess considerable knowledge of
environmental law. The Section need not abandon altogether its supervi-
sory responsibilities over the work of those prosecutors, but it can temper
its supervision in recognition of their expertise. Such recognition would
likely make Assistant United States Attorneys more willing to devote
attention to environmental cases. In addition, the lawyers in the Section
could spend less time simply supervising and more time preparing their
own cases for prosecution.
IV. CONCLUSION
Environmental law has assimilated so poorly into criminal law for
two reasons. First, policy makers have not yet directly faced the difficult
issues presented by such an assimilation, but instead have just assumed
them away by criminalizing virtually all environmental violations. Pol-
icy makers in both the legislative and executive branches need to focus
more carefully on the purpose of criminal law and the design of environ-
mental laws in defining the types of conduct warranting criminal sanc-
tions. Moreover, without a shared definition of what constitutes such
conduct, the current environmental crimes controversy will continue to
plague and hinder effective enforcement. More environmental criminal
enforcement is therefore needed, but more than additional resources are
required to make that happen.
Second, prosecutors in leadership positions lack expertise in both
environmental and criminal enforcement policy. Assimilation will only
occur once individual prosecutors gain expertise in both areas of the law.
Only then can they bridge the gap between the existing camps and pro-
mote the development of settled criteria for the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in specific cases. They also then will possess the credibility
necessary to reduce the adversarial dialogue currently dominating both
within the government and in the government's communication with the
general public.
These are not easy tasks. But, then again, little about the evolution
of environmental law and its assimilation during the past twenty-five
years has been easy. The task is instead necessarily as complex and in-
tractable as the workings of the natural environment that environmental
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law is itself designed to protect. Defining environmental crimes and then
establishing an effective criminal enforcement program are no different."
66. Just as this Essay was going to press, the Department of Justice published the results of
its internal investigation of the Environment Division's Environmental Crimes Program. See
CORCORAN ET AL., supra note 28. While the report generally "found no evidence substantiat-
ing the allegations that Justice Department officials or employees relied on improper criteria in
prosecuting or declining to prosecute environmental crimes cases," id. at 12, the report did
identify several significant problems-past and present-with the program. These include,
inter alia, (1) a frequent absence of teamwork and mutual respect [within the Environmental
Crimes Program], which has led to accusations that prosecution decisions have been made on
an improper basis, id. at 11-12; (2) the "problem of distrust" that has long plagued relations
between the executive and legislative branches regarding environmental policy, id. at 94-97; (3)
the failure of the Environmental Crimes Section to explain formally its reasons to decline
prosecution, id. at 115-16; (4) the prior efforts of political appointees within the Environment
Division to effectuate policy changes by becoming personally involved in individual indictment
decisions on an ad hoc basis, which prompted questions of improper political motivation,
rather than by issuing written policy statements that could have served as a basis for principled
discussion, id. at 133, 188-92; (5) "an unusual level of emotion and acrimony" within the
Environmental Crimes Section, id. at 167; see also id at 281; and (6) the absence of coordina-
tion between EPA and the Justice Department, id. at 301-02 (describing one "personal con-
flict" which "led to a highly adversarial exchange" and thus "destroyed the collegial
atmosphere that should exist at such meetings" and "diminished the stature of . . . the
Section").
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:867
